Intimidating a public servant rcw
Toscano first contends that the State failed to prove either second degree assault because it did not prove that Ms. 714, 718, 995 P.2d 107 (2000).¶ 9 Second degree assault means to “assault[ ] another with a deadly weapon.” RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). This is the definition of assault at issue here.¶ 10 Assault requires specific intent to create the apprehension of harm. Though such behavior is certainly reprehensible, it does not rise to the level of intimidation.
Sufficient Evidence—Second Degree Assault Charge¶ 7 Ms. “When a statute is unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial construction and its meaning must be derived from the plain language of the statute alone.” Id. A statute's meaning is a question of law and our review is therefore de novo. Toscano's essential argument is that her nonverbal conduct could not have been a threat. Stephenson to argue that she did not threaten the officer because she never made a “verbal statement.” 89 Wash. But the State cannot bring an intimidation charge any time a defendant insults or threatens a public servant.
Carrington could not stand because apprehension of harm was an element. So she could not have urged him to do anything, one way or the other.¶ 16 The State responds that there is more than one way to communicate a threat and here Ms. 415, 417–18, 132 P.3d 1095 (2006) (concluding that Mr.
FACTS¶ 2 This prosecution follows two near collisions between Grant County Deputy Sheriff Tyson Voss and Linda Kay Toscano in Warden, Washington, in the early morning of March 30, 2009. 779, 789, 307 P.3d 771 (2013), review denied 179 Wn.2d 1021 (2014). The requirement, however, is not an essential element of a harassment statute. Allen, 176 Wn.2d 611, 628, 294 P.3d 679 (2013); State v. Instead, the constitutional requirement of “true threat” merely defines and limits the scope of the essential threat element. This language incorporates the requirement that true threats be evaluated using an “objective standard that focuses on the speaker.” See, e.g., State v. An indirect threat may also constitute a true threat. 662, 145 P.3d 1224 (2006) (holding that an instruction defining “true threat” is not needed for the crime of intimidating a former witness, RCW 9A.72.110; the crime's elements are such that they limit the statute's application to true threats and exclude constitutionally protected speech). The true threat requirement is imposed so that criminal statutes prohibiting threats do not target constitutionally protected speech.